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Competitive	general	elections	can	mean	more
productive	legislators,	but	only	up	to	a	point.
The	public’s	levels	of	trust	and	confidence	in	Congress	have	been	at	rock	bottom	for	the
best	part	of	a	decade,	something	which	may	be	related	to	the	perception	that	lawmakers
do	very	little	whilst	they	are	in	Washington	DC.	But	can	the	threat	of	a	competitive	election
or	a	primary	challenge	spur	a	lawmaker	to	be	more	productive?	Analyzing	legislative
effectiveness	and	electoral	pressure,	Michael	J.	Barber	and	Soren	J.	Schmidt	find	that
while	the	safer	a	legislator	is	from	a	primary	challenger,	the	more	effective	they	are,
general	election	challenges	result	in	an	effectiveness	‘sweet	spot’.	After	this	point,	legislating	becomes	less	effective
as	lawmakers	need	to	switch	resources	away	from	lawmaking	and	towards	campaigning.
If	we	use	the	number	of	bills	passed	as	our	measure,	the	most	recent	congressional	sessions	have	been	the	least
productive	of	any	during	the	past	sixty	years.	Among	members	of	Congress,	however,	individual	levels	of	productivity
vary	widely;	some	legislators	are	far	more	effective	than	others	at	shepherding	their	bills	through	the	legislative
process.
At	the	same	time,	during	the	past	few	decades,	congressional	districts	have	become	increasingly	uncompetitive,	with
one	party	consistently	dominating.	But	even	lopsided	districts	don’t	always	mean	the	incumbent	is	safe—just	ask
former	House	Majority	Leader	Eric	Cantor	who	lost	his	Virginia	seat	to	a	primary	challenge	in	2014.	A	primary
challenger	can	be	just	as	dangerous	as	a	general	election	opponent,	and	even	more	so	in	districts	which	are
dominated	by	one	party.
The	desire	to	win	reelection—the	electoral	connection—is	perhaps	the	single	most	powerful	animator	of	legislator
behavior.	So,	how	exactly	do	legislators	respond	when	their	feet	are	put	to	the	electoral	fire?	And	are	their	responses
different	when	facing	competition	from	their	own	party	rather	than	the	opposing	one?
These	are	the	questions	that	we	take	up	in	our	recent	research.	While	electoral	competition	and	legislator
productivity	have	previously	been	studied	in	great	detail	separately,	our	research	is	the	first	to	explore	the
relationship	between	the	two	taking	into	account	both	general	and	primary	elections.
To	answer	those	questions,	we	combine	district	election	returns	with	Legislative	Effectiveness	Scores,	the	latter
comprising	both	the	quantity	and	progress	of	bills	produced	by	legislators,	for	each	member	of	the	US	House	of
Representatives	from	1979	to	2009.	After	controlling	for	other	known	drivers	of	individual	effectiveness	(for	example,
seniority,	committee	membership,	and	gender	we	then	measure	the	predicted	level	of	productivity	for	legislators	at
each	level	of	competition.
As	Figure	1	shows,	as	we	might	expect,	legislators	do	in	fact	adjust	their	bill	production	in	response	to	electoral
pressure.	The	adjustment	is	significant,	about	the	same	magnitude	as	is	associated	with	a	couple	extra	terms	of
seniority,	and	about	20	percent	the	size	of	the	large	boost	given	by	being	in	the	majority	party.	If	all	members	of
Congress	experienced	a	one	standard	deviation	change	in	vote	share,	our	models	predict	that	the	aggregate	number
of	bills	passed	into	law	would	fluctuate	by	about	ten	in	response.	However,	the	pattern	of	that	response	is	markedly
different	for	general	and	primary	election	competition	in	ways	that	may	not	be	immediately	intuitive.	
Figure	1
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In	general	elections,	we	observe	a	quadratic	relationship	between	competition	and	productivity,	with	the	latter
peaking	when	the	legislator	received	about	75	percent	of	the	vote	share	in	the	previous	election.	While	our	results
don’t	reveal	the	precise	causal	relationship	at	play	here,	in	our	view	they	do	suggest	what	we	might	call	an	electoral
“sweet	spot.”	We	know	that	members	of	Congress	facing	grave	threats	in	the	general	election	often	turn	to
fundraising,	campaigning,	and	providing	constituent	services	in	an	effort	to	win	popular	support.	On	the	other	hand,
legislators	that	are	(virtually)	unopposed	have	little	motivation	to	do	extra	vote-winning	of	any	kind,	including	by
producing	legislation.	Consequently,	we	observe	a	“sweet	spot”	where	there	is	enough	electoral	pressure	to	spur	bill
production,	but	not	so	much	that	members	of	Congress	feel	they	must	abandon	legislating	to	focus	on	campaigning.
With	primary	election	competition,	it’s	a	different	story.	The	relationship	with	productivity	is	linear,	not	quadratic:	the
safer	the	legislator,	the	more	effective	she	is.	What	accounts	for	the	difference?	Again,	our	results	can’t	answer	that
question	with	any	certainty,	but	we	do	have	some	clues.	For	example,	serious	primary	challengers	are	much	rarer
than	strong	general	election	opponents;	the	vast	majority	of	legislators,	especially	incumbents,	run	virtually
unopposed.	When	primary	pressure	does	mount	in	any	kind	of	serious	way,	then,	legislators	may	be	more	reactive	in
switching	to	activities	other	than	producing	legislation	(campaigning,	etc).
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There’s	one	final	wrinkle	worth	consideration.	How	might	general	and	primary	election	competition	interact	with	one
another	in	influencing	legislator	productivity?	The	preferences	of	the	constituencies	that	vote	in	each	are	often	in
tension	with	one	another,	and	legislators	may	struggle	to	appease	them	both.	To	explore	that	question,	we	subsetted
our	models	across	one	election	stage’s	vote	share	while	estimating	the	effects	of	the	other.
The	basic	takeaway	from	our	models	is	this:	at	least	when	it	comes	to	productivity	legislators	are	only	responsive	to
competition	in	one	stage	when	they	are	safe	in	the	other.	What	could	be	driving	this	interactive	effect?	It	could	be	as
simple	as	limited	assets:	legislators	simply	may	not	have	the	time	or	policy	and	campaign	resources	to	respond	to
more	than	one	close	election	at	a	time.	Moreover,	given	the	disparate	demands	of	voters	at	the	primary	and	general
stage,	it	may	simply	be	impossible	for	a	legislator	to	respond	to	both	simultaneously;	she	is	forced	to	focus	her
decisions	(at	least	in	terms	of	allocating	resources	to	bill	production)	on	one	of	those	elections	and	set	aside	the
other.
Taken	together,	these	results	shed	new	light	on	the	relationship	between	elections—both	general	and	primary—and
legislators’	choices	while	in	office.	This	relationship	is	crucial	to	our	understanding	of	democratic	accountability,
especially	in	an	era	of	growing	political	polarization.	Much	scholarship	has	studied	the	institutional	effects	of
polarization	on	collective	outcomes	in	Congress,	but	more	work	is	needed	to	understand	how	current	trends	play	out
at	the	level	of	individual	legislators.	We	hope	our	work	opens	the	door	to	such	future	research.
A	version	of	this	article	first	appeared	at	LegBranch	and	is	based	on	the	paper,	‘Electoral	Competition	and
Legislator	Effectiveness’,	in	American	Politics	Research’.
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